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The Politicization of the Genocide Label: 
Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council
  Michelle E. Ringrose
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
Individual nations, as well as the United Nations (UN), have been historically reluctant to label 
and frame a situation genocide.1 Terms such as “ethnic cleansing” or “genocidal acts,” are common 
euphemisms for genocide, used to avoid the legally mandated obligation to intervene, to prevent or 
halt genocides.2 The continued diplomatic contention regarding the application of the genocide label 
is exemplified with respect to the 1915 Armenian genocide. This dispute perpetuates a normalcy to 
debates over claims of genocide, creating a discourse of denial and divisive politics which becomes 
synonymous with the application of the genocide label. This historical reluctance to label an act as 
genocide is also evident in the treatment of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Clinton administration 
in the United States (US) specifically avoided the use of the word genocide in a semantic charade to 
negate the perceived obligation to “actually do something.”3 Although New Zealand and the Czech 
Republic entertained the notion of labeling the situation in Rwanda a genocide, the US strongly 
opposed the use of such strong rhetoric, a position which received significant support among other 
Security Council members.4 Not only does this speak to the historical reluctance to label a genocide 
as such, but also the influential power ascribed to the UN Security Council Permanent Five (P5) 
members in shaping broader international discourses concerning such labeling.
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide notes a 
finding of genocide requires member-states and competent organs of the UN to prevent and 
punish such acts.5 However, despite this obligation, and the fact that the Convention provides 
a detailed definition of what acts constitute genocide, the use of euphemisms in referring to 
situations involving the apparent commission of genocide remains widespread. When an atrocity 
is not recognized as a genocide, a dangerous precedent is set for future acts of semantic avoidance, 
and the ability of areas affected by genocide to recover is severely hampered.6 The UN Framework 
of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes asserts that past acts of genocide, serious human rights violations, 
and crimes against humanity are prominent indicators of a heightened risk of future genocides.7 
This claim is supported by research demonstrating that a history of violence and aggression 
makes the engagement in future violent acts as a means of responding to conflict and hostility 
more likely.8 Given that governments which deny genocide are three times more likely to commit 
another genocide, international recognition is central to maintaining peace and security.9 It was not 
until Winston Churchill’s 1941 speech in which he stated “we are in the presence of a crime without 
a name,” that the absence of a label to describe the systematic mass murder of a group of people 
1 Ervin Staub, “The Roots and Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Violence,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 47, 
no. 4 (2012), 822, accessed March 1, 2016, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01302.x.
2 Rony Blum et al., “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide,” European Journal of Public Health 18, no. 2 
(2007), 204, accessed April 28, 2015, doi: 10.1093/eurpub/ckm011.
3 Eric A. Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared,” Political Science 
Quarterly 122, no. 3 (2007), 366, accessed June 12, 2016, doi: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00602.x.
4 Ibid., 364.
5 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, December 9, 
1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260 (III)). 
6 Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 
1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no.1 (2003), 61, accessed April 14, 2016, doi: 10.1017/S0003055403000522.
7 United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, October 30, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf. 
8 Harff, No Lessons, 61; Omar McDoom, “Predicting Violence Within Genocide: A Model of Elite Competition and 
Ethnic Segregation from Rwanda,” Political Geography 42, no. 1 (2014), 36, accessed May 30, 2015, doi: 10.1016/j.
polgeo.2014.05.006; Staub, The Roots, 838.
9 Gregory Stanton, “Cost of Denial,” (speech, April 23, 2008), accessed June 6, 2016, http://www.genocidewatch.com/cost-
of-denial.
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became apparent.10 Despite the pioneering efforts of Raphael Lemkin to fill this void by coining the 
term “genocide,” the term continues to be avoided to this day.
This article explores the ways in which language is used by P5 nations in the Security Council 
to avoid genocide recognition using the Srebrenica genocide as a case study. Srebrenica is an ideal 
case study to examine such rhetorical positioning for a number of reasons. First, the atrocities that 
occurred in Srebrenica constitute the largest genocide in Europe since the Holocaust and symbolize 
a failure of intelligence collection during peacekeeping operations, thereby undermining the 
credibility of western governments and the UN.11 Second, Srebrenica occurred on the heels of the 
Rwandan genocide a year earlier, and thus the discussion at the UN, concerning Srebrenica, arose 
in an environment where the UN P5 and the international community more generally, were all 
coming to terms with the consequences of their inaction in Rwanda. Third, in recent years, there 
has been a turn towards formal recognition of Srebrenica as a genocide by the UN, providing 
an interesting opportunity to consider the historical context of the use of the term genocide by 
the P5 over time. As noted above, genocide recognition has important consequences in reducing 
the likelihood of future violence. In the case of Srebrenica, Prosecutor Serge Brammertz of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) expressed concern regarding the 
repercussions of the continued denial of the Srebrenica genocide with respect to both individual 
harm to victims and families, and also the inhibition of reconciliation and the reinforcement of 
communal divisions within the former Yugoslavia.12 Such concerns highlight the significance of 
genocide recognition and the ongoing timeliness of considering the Srebrenica case.
Through an analysis of diplomatic language utilized by UN P5 nations concerning how and 
whether to label Srebrenica a genocide, this article explores the intersections of language, power, 
and politics by examining how P5 nations choose to frame the genocide in Srebrenica in public 
UN Security Council debates. To do so, this article first considers the significance of an attention to 
language and its use by P5 members in particular, before introducing the specific case of Srebrenica 
while focusing on the history and context of the use—or avoidance—of the term “genocide.” After 
establishing this context, the article turns to an examination of the language used by P5 members 
in debates concerning Srebrenica. This language is analyzed through the lens of framing theory, 
an approach adopted from its common use in mass-media communications theory to serve as a 
method of analyzing how particular nations frame and represent narratives around the genocide 
label. This analysis proceeds in two parts. The first part involves an exploration of the explicit 
use of the term “genocide” by P5 nations. The second part then considers situations where P5 
nations employ euphemisms to avoid using the term. Together, an analysis of these discourses 
demonstrates how UN Security Council P5 members use language as a mechanism to frame a 
conflict in a particular way that aligns with their own national political interests. Through this 
analysis, this article reaffirms the importance of explicit semantic genocide recognition, not only as 
an important legal determination, but one that also affects acknowledgment of the significance of 
a given atrocity event, and post-conflict growth and mediation processes.
Diplomatic Language and Genocide Recognition
Language is commonly used as a method for framing a particular interpretation of an act or event. 
Language used within international relations represents a culmination of dominant ideologies 
10 Winston Churchill, “Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s Broadcast to the World about the Meeting with 
President Roosevelt,” (speech, London, August 24 1941) accessed October 18, 2018, https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/
timeline/410824awp.html.
11 Erna Rijsdijk, “The Politics of Hard Knowledge: Uncertainty, Intelligence Failures and the ‘Last Minute 
Genocide’ of Srebrenica,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011), 2222, accessed May 7, 2016, doi: 
10.1080/17512786.2013.841370; Mirza Velagic and Zlatka Velagic, “Do Court Rulings Matter? International Courts and 
Journalists’ Framing of the Srebrenica Genocide,” Journalism Practice 8, no. 4 (2014), 423, accessed July 2, 2016, doi: 
10.1080/17512786.2013.841370.
12 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor Serge Brammertz meets with Representative of 
Victims Associations,” (statement, The Hague, September 30, 2014), accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.icty.org/en/
press/prosecutor-serge-brammertz-met-representatives-victims-associations. 
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from social, political, and academic discourses.13 The construction of language does not always aim 
to perpetuate a single reality and can be used both as a form of communication and strategically to 
perpetuate certain “realities.”14 The language used within international political arenas is calculated 
and complex. This complexity is exacerbated when nations must navigate discussions concerning 
potential genocides, as within such contexts, language becomes moderated by national interests 
and transnational diplomacy.
In 1988, the term ethnic purge (“etnicheskie chistki”) was used by Soviet officials to 
describe the ethnic based forced removal of Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh.15 Slobodan 
Milošević meanwhile, became the first politician to use the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe 
Kosovar Albanian commander’s violence towards Serbians.16 The term subsequently became part 
of the common vernacular of perpetrators and bystanders of the Srebrenica genocide and is now 
commonly referenced in UN documentation, as well as more generally in scholarly and diplomatic 
discussions of numerous atrocity situations. Such language remains despite the fact that “ethnic 
cleansing” implicitly suggests that massacres may serve as a means of improving hygiene through 
the “cleansing” of a region, and lacks any formal definition, legal or otherwise. The term has 
been adopted by many politicians and journalists and has penetrated the official language of 
international law and diplomacy.17 In Rwanda, avoidance of the term genocide as mass killings 
took place, acted as a diplomatic excuse for non-intervention, contributing to the deaths of over 
800,000 people. While “ethnic cleansing” is commonly used by the UN and human rights groups 
in ways that are undoubtedly well-intentioned, the use of this term has been found to be associated 
with denial and delay in bystander intervention.18 The use of “ethnic cleansing” and other similar 
terms, especially when such use is part of a concerted effort to avoid the language of genocide, 
indicates an unwillingness to take forceful action to prevent imminent atrocities or halt them once 
they commence. Based on their analysis of the use of the terms “ethnic cleansing” and genocide in 
legal literature, UN press statements, and statements made by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, Blum, Stanton, Sagi and Richter argue that “the ratio between the terms ‘genocide 
and ‘ethnic cleansing’ measures the will for emergency response.”19 It is not until atrocities have 
been explicitly labeled as genocide that force has been used to stop them.20 For example, it was not 
until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the civil war and ended the genocide that the US State 
Department finally acknowledged genocide had occurred. Although the US government referred 
to “acts of genocide” occurring in Rwanda in May, 1994, this specific phrasing was a pragmatic 
determination used as part of a concerted effort to avoid any legal obligation to intervene and 
occurred six weeks after the mass killings began, when denying that a genocide was unfolding in 
Rwanda became an untenable position.21 While it has been argued that the genocide label has lost 
its normative power in terms of its assumed obligations to prevent and punish acts of genocide, 
this article argues its power extends beyond the perceived obligation for intervention.22 
While many lamented the absence of civil society mobilization and the avoidance of 
genocide recognition in Rwanda, tens of thousands rallied in support of intervention in Darfur, 
13 Karin Marie Fierke, “Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations,” International Studies 
Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2002), 351, accessed May 14, 2016, http://www.jstor.org.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/stable/3096092.
14 Ibid., 349.
15 Blum et al., Ethnic Cleansing, 204
16 Ibid., 205.
17 Ibid., 204. 
18 Ibid., 207.
19 Ibid., 205.
20 Ibid., 207.
21 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 361.
22 Luke Glanville, “Is “Genocide” Still a Powerful Word?” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 4 (2009), 468, accessed 
November 19, 2018, doi: 10.1080/14623520903309529.
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in part because of the widespread identification of the conflict as genocide.23 While the debate of 
whether or not Darfur was a genocide may have detracted from meaningful action, it is unlikely 
Darfur would have gained such widespread support without the power of the genocide frame.24 
It is also noteworthy that the Bush administration labeled Darfur a genocide through a morally 
unambiguous framing of “saving” Darfur by western powers, with the UN subsequently noting 
there was insufficient evidence for a determination of genocide.25 While no actual hierarchy of 
international crimes exists in any legal sense, it remains important to recognize the ability of the 
genocide label to mobilize international advocacy efforts as well as its role in altering the trajectory 
from violence as a means of conflict resolution to one of international recognition and mediation.
Genocide recognition also extends beyond a legal call for intervention, given its ability to 
provide victims with acknowledgment of the crimes that have been committed against them. 
This acknowledgment is increasingly important as we are now aware of the significant impacts 
of genocide denial in the form of transgenerational cultural trauma for descendants of genocide 
survivors.26 The narrative of genocide denial has been connected to feelings of resentment and of 
one’s personhood being attacked, amongst descendants of genocide victims, both of which have 
significant psychological implications.27 The recognition of crimes perpetrated against a group of 
people has far-reaching impacts in easing the trauma of victims and, more importantly, in reducing 
the likelihood of revenge.28 Acknowledging the culpability for crimes committed also provides a 
base for reducing “othering” on the basis of cultural, national, religious or ethnic grounds.29
The Security Council is the peak body in the UN for binding decisions and has the power 
to authorize intervention in situations of mass atrocities. As such, the UN Security Council, and 
the language used by the P5 members in particular, is of significance when exploring the use of 
language and assessing national interests in responses to genocide. Claude notes that in instances 
of Security Council engagement with mass atrocities, a myriad of factors influence language use.30 
The use of particular phrases and language is commonly challenged by P5 nations in the pursuit 
of political goals. For example, some argue that the motivation for the US labeling the atrocities in 
Darfur a genocide in 2004 was to create a “philanthropic alibi” for US projection of power, as well 
as, to improve the human rights image of the Bush administration prior to an upcoming election.31 
Do Monte furthers this notion by asserting that control over language within the Security Council 
is a means of projecting power.32 
Language in this domain reinforces power hierarchies by giving a stronger voice to privilege, 
such as P5 nations. Gifkins postulates that there are three key reasons as to why language used 
within the Security Council is of significance in decision-making processes.33 Firstly, language is not 
static and is representative of member-states’ political attitudes at a particular time.34 Essentially, 
26 Selina L. Mangassarian, “100 Years of Trauma: The Armenian Genocide and Intergenerational Cultural 
Trauma,” Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 25, no. 4 (2016), 9, accessed September 10, 2017, doi: 
10.1080/10926771.2015.1121191.
27 Anie Kalayjian and Marian Weisberg, “Generational Impacts of Mass Trauma: The Post-Ottoman Turkish Genocide 
of the Armenians,” in Jihad and Sacred Vengeance, ed. Jerry S. Piven, Chris Boyd, and Henry W. Lawton, (New York: 
Writers Club Press, 2002), 264. 
28 Belinda Cooper and Taner Akçam, “Turks, Armenians, and the “G-Word,” World Policy Journal 22, no. 3 (2005), 88, 
accessed October 16, 2018, https://search-proquest-com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/docview/232587799?OpenUrlRefId=i
nfo:xri/sid:primo&accountid=13380.
29 Ibid., 88.
30 Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organisation 20, no. 3 
(1996), 368, accessed May 14, 2016, doi: 10.1017/S0020818300012832.
31 Samuel Totten, “The US Investigation into the Darfur Crisis and the US Government’s Determination of Genocide,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An international Journal 1, no. 9 (2006), 12, accessed February 21, 2016, http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=gsp.
32 Izadora Xavier Do Monte, “The Pen is Mightier than the H-Bomb,” International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 18, no. 5 
(2016), 671, accessed August 3, 2016, doi: 10.1080/1369801X.2015.1131180.
33 Jess Gifkins, “R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and Beyond,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 2 (2016), 150, 
accessed March 14, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0010836715613365.
34 Helen Fein, Walter Ezell, and Herbert F. Spirer, “Recognition of Genocide in Bosnia: Frameworks of Interpretation in 
US Newspapers,” Studies in Communication 6, no. 1 (2011), 79, accessed April 14, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0275-
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language use is a representative “snapshot,” illustrating the dominant discourse of a particular 
period.35 Secondly, drafting resolutions and engaging in debate is “both political and routine” 
as promoting an innovative linguistic frame may be profoundly political, however, through the 
process of repetition, its use becomes normalized.36 Dunne and Gifkins assert that this dynamic 
stems from the value placed upon “previously agreed language” as an indicator of consensus 
among Council members.37 Finally, the repetition of particular phrases within the Security Council 
is not “simple automation devoid of meaning,” but rather, a process of cognitive reaffirmation 
and perpetuation of shared meaning.38 Essentially, member-states may affirm their position on 
an atrocity event by continuously associating such events with terms such as “ethnic cleansing,” 
and subsequently presenting that particular linguistic frame as previously agreed language. 
Werner notes that by recalling language used previously as well as utilizing existing normative 
frameworks, decisions made in the Security Council are seen as being a part of a wider history of 
international regulation as opposed to random choices.39 The use of language within a discourse of 
transnational diplomacy is a calculated amalgamation of a number of variables including; power, 
national interest, previously agreed language, and linguistic repetition. The extent to which these 
variables moderate the recognition of an act of genocide within the UN Security Council requires 
further consideration. This is significant given the importance of such recognition for post-conflict 
mediation, the reparation of communal divisions, and the psychological wellbeing of victims and 
survivors. 
Srebrenica
The Srebrenica genocide occurred only one year after the world said “never again” following 
Rwanda. As the largest genocide on European soil since the Holocaust, discussions of the Srebrenica 
genocide have been marked by divisive politics and acts of genocide denial, creating the potential 
for transgenerational trauma among victims and their families. The genocide in Srebrenica 
occurred during the Bosnian war (1992-1995), involving the declaration of independence of the 
countries making up the former Yugoslavia. Srebrenica, a town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), lies only 15 kilometers from the Serbian border and as such, was of strategic significance to 
Serbian forces.40 In 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring, “all parties and others 
treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a ‘safe area’ that should be free from armed attack or 
any other hostile act.”41 However, on July 11, 1995 the Bosnian Serb army, under the command of 
Ratko Mladić, entered Srebrenica, largely uncontested by Dutch peacekeepers. Shortly thereafter, 
approximately 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were systematically murdered, predominantly 
through mass executions.42
Although the atrocities in Srebrenica occurred with limited international resistance, the past 
two decades have seen political and judicial recognition that the actions of the Bosnian Serb forces 
constituted genocide.43 Though some contention does exist within academic literature regarding 
labeling Srebrenica a genocide, largely with reference to the ability to prove intent, rulings by the 
7982(2011)0000006007. 
35 Gifkins, R2P in the UNSC, 150.
36 Ibid.
37 Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins, “Libya and the State of Intervention,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 
(2011), 523, accessed May 16, 2016, doi: 10.1080/10357718.2011.613148. 
38 Gifkins, R2P in the UNSC, 151. 
39 Wouter Werner, “Recall it again, Sam. Practices of Repetition in the Security Council,” Nordic Journal of International Law 
86, no. 2 (2017), 155, accessed January 22, 2018, doi: 10.1163/15718107-08602001.
40 Katherine Southwick, “Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstic Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable,” Yale Human 
Rights and Development Journal 8, no. 1 (2005), 192, accessed May 11, 2016, http://link.galegroup.com.ezp01.library.qut.
edu.au/apps/doc/A134381809/LT?u=qut&sid=LT&xid=be7ecf2e.
41 United Nations, 3199th Meeting of the Security Council, New York, April 16, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/819).
42 Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad and Henrick Urdal, “Accounting for Genocide: How Many were Killed in 
Srebrenica?” European Journal of Population 19, no. 1 (2003), 230, accessed May 12, 2016, doi: 10.1023/A:1024949307841.
43 Larissa Van Den Herik, “Accountability Through Fact Finding: Appraising Inquiry in the Context of Srebrenica,” 
Netherlands International Law Review 62, no. 2 (2015), 300, accessed April 5, 2016, doi: 10.1007/s40802-015-0035-9.
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ICTY and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) both concluded that the atrocities in Srebrenica 
legally constituted genocide.44
Despite the determination of genocide in Srebrenica by the ICTY and the ICJ, this finding 
did not penetrate the official language of international law or diplomatic discourses within the 
UN for some time. Although Srebrenica is currently referred to as a genocide within UN public 
documentation, this has not always been the case. For example, in a 2005 commemorative speech, 
former Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to the Srebrenica genocide as a “massacre.”45 Even 
when referring to the ICTY indictments of Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, which included 
genocide charges, Annan did not to refer to genocide.46 This omission may be contrasted with a 
commemorative speech delivered in 2015 by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who openly 
referred to Srebrenica as a genocide.47 On July 8, 2015, a draft resolution was introduced which 
would formally acknowledge within the Security Council that the atrocities which had occurred 
in Srebrenica constituted genocide. France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US voted in favor 
of the resolution; China abstained from voting, and Russia voted against the resolution.48 Within 
debates on the draft resolution, Russia declared that the resolution, which was submitted by the 
UK, was politically motivated and would only lead to greater tension within BiH. However, the 
veto of the resolution by Russia can be seen as a manifestation of the impact of domestic politics on 
international policy, as it has been argued that Russia vetoed the resolution due to their political 
ties with Serbia.49
In contrast to the UN’s apprehension to label Srebrenica a genocide, advocacy groups used the 
language of genocide in reference to the Srebrenica massacres only weeks after the atrocities were 
committed.50 For example, Holly Burkhalter, advocacy director of Human Rights Watch at the time, 
published a piece in the Washington Post on July 20, 1995, only nine days after the atrocities of 
Srebrenica. In the article, titled “what we can do to stop genocide,” Burkhalter argued that the clear 
effort by the Serbian Military to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population “in whole or in part” in 
Srebrenica and surrounding areas, constituted a “textbook case of genocide.”51 The emergence of 
the genocide label within this discourse, so soon after Srebrenica, demonstrates that it was in the 
lexicon of advocacy works and journalists, and as such, was available for diplomats to use. While 
civil society groups commonly use language as a tool for framing a conflict, particularly to mobilize 
wider public attention for a given cause, the genocide label is not just avoided to circumvent the 
mandated obligation for intervention. The use of the genocide label to describe the Holocaust and 
the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia created reference points for an implicit moral weight that 
may be absent when referring to crimes against humanity.52 The difficulty in proving specific intent 
44 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, August 2, 2001; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007; Edward Herman and David 
Peterson, The Politics of Genocide (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010), 47.
45 Security Council Report, Srebrenica Anniversary, July 1, 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-
forecast/2015-07/bosnia_and_herzegovina_5.php; Kofi Annan, “May we all Learn and Act on the Lessons of 
Srebrenica,” (speech, New York, July 11, 2005), accessed August 5, 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm9993.
doc.htm. 
46 Annan, May we all Learn, 1.
47 Ban Ki-moon, “Srebrenica: Remembering and Honouring the Victims of the Genocide,” (speech, New York, July 1, 
2015), accessed August 12, 2016, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2015-07-01/secretary-generals-
remarks-high-level-commemorative-event-srebrenica.
48 United Nations, 7481st Meeting of the Security Council, New York, July 8, 2015 (UN Doc. S/PV.7481).
49 Reid Standish, “Why did Russia Veto Recognising Srebrenica as Genocide,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2015, accessed August 
12, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-recognizing-srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-
bosnia/; Bridget Kendall, “Russia Vetoes UN Move to call Srebrenica ‘Genocide,’” British Broadcasting Corporation, July 
7, 2015, accessed August 12, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33445772. 
50 Power, A Problem from Hell, 402.
51 Holly Burkhalter, “What Can we do to Stop this Genocide,” Washington Post, July 20, 1995, accessed August 14, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/07/20/what-we-can-do-to-stop-this-genocide/49e17fad-cee2-
4b47-b316-6db07df51efc/?utm_term=.3b6238494b97.
52 Dawn L. Rothe and Christopher W. Mullins, “Darfur and the Politicization of International Law: Genocide or Crimes 
Against Humanity?” Humanity & Society 31, no.1 (2007), 84, accessed May 12, 2016, http://has.sagepub.com.ezp01.
library.qut.edu.au/content/31/1/83.full.pdf+html.
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is also commonly used as an argument to avoid the genocide label. For example, some refute the 
application of the genocide label to the Srebrenica massacres, as the killing of military age boys 
and men was seen as a tactic of war, as opposed to an act specifically intended to destroy the area’s 
Bosnian Muslim population in whole or in part.53 Serbia still refuses to label Srebrenica a genocide 
with various political parties in Serbia both disputing both the events surrounding Srebrenica as 
well as questioning the evidence of the genocide itself.54 This trend continues with Milorad Dodik, 
the former president of Republika Srpska, strongly opposing children in Republika Srpska schools 
being taught about the Srebrenica genocide, or the siege of Sarajevo.55 When one considers these 
broader discourses surrounding Srebrenica, both within and outside of the Security Council, the 
highly divisive and politicized nature of the use of the genocide label becomes apparent.
Methodology 
In examining the language used by the P5 around Srebrenica, this article adopts an exploratory, 
post-positivist methodological approach, allowing for a focus on the meaning behind a construct, 
rather than observable fact. It adopts the use of framing from the mass-media communications 
theory, known as framing theory, to consider how particular nations frame and represent narratives 
surrounding the label of genocide. The term framing is derived from Goffman’s “schemata of 
interpretation” that allows individuals to “locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within 
their space and the world at large.56 Entman extends this definition by noting that framing is to “select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/
or treatment recommendation.”57 Framing within mass media is usually moderated by variables 
such as professional norms or organizational/ideological values which are subsequently reflected 
in a journalist’s coverage of events.58 Similarly, the use of framing within international relations 
and foreign policy refers to the use of political rhetoric and manipulation in an attempt to influence 
attitudes and behaviors or influence decision-making.59 While scholars have explored how the 
media framed the genocide in Srebrenica, the political response of nation-states to this genocide 
has not been considered in terms of framing theory.60 Framing theory posits that the manner in 
which something is presented to an audience influences how that information is interpreted and 
processed.61 Framing is a central component of politics and policy-making processes given its ability 
to shape public opinion.62 Political elites commonly engage in framing processes, with one of the 
most notable examples being the declaration of war by US President George W. Bush following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. While other avenues for framing were available and 
other enemies may have been identified, the “war on terror” frame and the necessity of military 
intervention in Afghanistan was considered vital in perpetuating an emotionally compelling and 
53 Herman and Peterson, The Politics of Genocide, 47. 
54 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, “Knowledge, Acknowledgment and Denial in Serbia’s Responses to the Srebrenica 
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unambiguous frame to the public.63 By analyzing the political framing of genocide, the use of 
rhetorical devices can be examined by highlighting common euphemisms used in lieu of genocide, 
and making connections between these and the political discourses behind such euphemisms.
The data used for this project was collected from UNBISNET, a publicly available database 
providing bibliographic records, voting records, and meeting records for different organs of the 
UN. A key word search was conducted with relevant debates found under the topics “BiH,” 
“former Yugoslavia situation,” and “ICTY.” The search was subsequently narrowed by action 
body, in this case, the only relevant organ being the Security Council. The dates were also narrowed 
temporally, to only encompass debates between 1995 and 2015. This search process yielded a total 
of 32 documents in which Srebrenica was referenced by P5 nations. The data for this article was 
drawn from these 32 documents, all of which were weighted equally.
As language used within Security Council debates is an area with limited research, the 
process of inductive coding was instrumental in identifying unanticipated themes which may 
not have been identified through deductive methods. Genocide-related rhetoric was identified 
through numerous readings of relevant documents and document search tool functions. Common 
euphemisms used to avoid labeling an atrocity as a genocide were identified through both analysis 
of relevant literature, and the language employed by P5 members when other nations referred to the 
crimes committed at Srebrenica as genocide, in what became clear as semantic avoidance.64 When 
a particular theme emerged, the data was coded for discourse as well as for the P5 nations which 
engaged with this particular rhetoric. The absence of particular discourses, silences, and other 
salient themes within the data were also noted, as what remains unstated, is often as significant as 
what is stated.65 The use of discourse analysis allowed for an in-depth analysis of power, politics 
and language. To analyze the results of this project, the key themes identified through the open 
and axial coding processes were reviewed and attention was paid to textual variation and silences 
within a particular theme. An analysis of variation has the ability to highlight discrepancies 
regarding the way particular nations framed the Srebrenica genocide through language use. This 
process also enabled the evolution of the particular linguistic frame(s) adopted by a particular 
nation to be tracked over time, and for comparisons to be made among the P5 nations. 
Security Council P5 members were selected as the exclusive focus of this study in order to 
narrow the scope of analysis, while focusing on especially powerful actors; however, there would 
be merit in similar analyses being conducted on additional document sets, such as ICTY legal 
decisions related to Srebrenica, or discussions of P5 debates related to genocide, and Srebrenica in 
the press. Studies of these document sets would provide interesting complementary analyses to 
that conducted here.
Use of Genocide Label 
The following section outlines how the Srebrenica massacres were framed by the P5 members 
through explicit references to genocide in Security Council debates. The use of the genocide label 
refers to instances in which Srebrenica is explicitly referred to as a genocide without any form of 
deflection or qualification. While such explicit use of the genocide label in reference to Srebrenica 
was rare in the debates analyzed, this section will discuss in what context the Srebrenica genocide 
was recognized as such, and how such recognition was moderated by variables such as domestic 
politics, the framing of national image, and coalition preferences in international diplomacy. 
Within Security Council debates, the P5 nations that frame Srebrenica as a genocide incite 
much stronger linguistic and political rhetoric than the deflective use of euphemisms. Luban 
notes that when the public sees an atrocity framed as murder, motivation to intervene is lost.66 
63 Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 9/11,” Political Communication 20, no. 
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The use of the word genocide implores international action whereas “mere” murder promotes the 
discourse as the situation being “their” (i.e. a wholly local) problem.67 Linguistically, genocide has 
implications that the use of euphemisms such as mass killing does not.
Srebrenica was framed as a genocide by non-P5 nations such as Morocco and Turkey as early 
as November 1995.68 This particular frame coincides with the first indictment by the ICTY against 
Dragan Nikolić, a detention camp commander, as well as the indictment of Radovan Karadžić 
and Ratko Mladić on genocide charges in July.69 Even with this precedent set by these nations 
and the ICTY, the genocide frame was not adopted by a P5 nation until November 2010. It was 
the US who first explicitly labeled Srebrenica a genocide in a statement to “condemn denials of 
the Srebrenica genocide, which are simply indefensible, [and] undermine respect for the rule of 
law, impede reconciliation, and hinder inter-ethnic cooperation.”70 What is notable about this 
initial reference and subsequent references by the US, is that their aim appears to have been 
focused primarily on condemning other nations, rather than making a clear statement recognizing 
Srebrenica as a site of genocide. Among explicit genocide references made by the US, other notable 
linguistic features include their descriptive and formal language, and consistent use of collective 
pronouns, exemplified by the previously quoted statement. Despite the US referring to Srebrenica 
as a genocide in 2010, this initial recognition did not signify a complete shift in US framing of the 
Srebrenica genocide, as both the genocide label and various euphemisms continued to be used 
interchangeably by the US from 2014 onwards. Upon further analysis of the data, it is evident that 
US representatives to the UN who referred to Srebrenica as a genocide were different individuals 
than those who engaged in the use of genocidal euphemisms. Explicit US references to Srebrenica 
as a genocide occurred in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015, and were made by Rosemary DiCarlo, 
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, and Samantha Power. However, statements by US representative David 
Pressman used euphemisms when referring to the Srebrenica genocide in 2014 and 2015. All of 
these individuals were US representatives to the UN under the Obama administration and as such, 
the shifting US rhetoric from 2012 to 2015 cannot be attributed to changes in the US administration.
It is not until 2015 that another P5 nation explicitly framed the Srebrenica massacres as 
a genocide. On May 12, 2015, the UK observed “[t]he seventieth anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War and the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide this year illustrate 
that in every generation Bosnians, Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnia Serbs have suffered from 
conflict.”71 As is seen in this statement, the manner in which the UK frames Srebrenica is similar to 
that of the US, combining a relatively factual depiction of the massacres with the use of collective 
pronouns. The US and the UK however, frame Srebrenica using far more emotive rhetoric in July 
2015, when a debate was held concerning as to whether the Security Council would officially label 
Srebrenica a genocide. As can be seen in the following extract from the US, the language shifts, 
becoming more expressive with respect to sentiment and descriptions of the atrocities. 
Imagine being the mother of those five sons, killed in the Srebrenica genocide, and being 
told that a denial of the genocide would advance reconciliation. It is madness — a madness 
motivated by a similar negation of the Bosnian Muslim experience that helped fuel the 
slaughter at Srebrenica in the first place. As long as the truth is denied — whether in the 
Council or in the region — there can be no meaningful reconciliation. Imagine if this were 
us — if those were our families. Would we reconcile when our experience was being denied? 
There is no stability in genocide denial. The Council did everything in its power to get Russia 
on board with this simple draft resolution, which does not even name the perpetrators, but 
facpub/893/.
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Russia had a red line. The draft resolution could not reference the genocide in Srebrenica; it 
could not reference a fact.72
The same features are also seen in the way the UK frames Srebrenica in this particular debate. The 
language used evokes an emotional response and represents a noticeable shift in rhetoric. 
Some said that in submitting this draft resolution, we risked ethnic division in the Balkans. 
The emotional responses in the region in the past weeks show that until past actions are 
acknowledged and accepted, we cannot move forward. As Adisada Dudic said so poignantly 
at the commemorative event last week, “Denial does not make the facts go away. It does not 
change the past. And it certainly does not erase memory.” It is denial, and not this draft 
resolution, that will cause division. Denial is the final insult to the victims. It undermines 
the prospects for a secure, peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina — a future that all 
of its citizens deserve. Because, even two decades on, the horrors some choose to deny are 
still ongoing for families in Bosnia. The remains of hundreds of the victims of the genocide 
— fathers, sons, mothers and daughters — have yet to be found. The suffering of their loved 
ones, and their search for truth, continues to this day. Russia’s actions will only exacerbate 
their grief.73
There is also a notable shift from collective to individual language by the US, with the 
representative, in this case Samantha Power, referring to her own experiences as a journalist in 
the former Yugoslavia as well her personal disappointment regarding Russia’s veto of the draft 
resolution.74
France did not join the US and the UK in framing Srebrenica as a genocide until the draft 
resolution strongly condemning Srebrenica and labeling it a genocide, was presented to the 
Council in July 2015. On July 8, 2015, France stated that “[u]nfortunately, the Security Council today 
could not adopt a draft resolution to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica 
genocide and to pay tribute to all the innocent victims on all sides of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”75 Although France explicitly frames the Srebrenica massacres as genocide, the 
language employed by France does not incite as strong of an emotive response as that of the UK 
and the US. Instead, France’s statement is more reminiscent of the language used by the other P5 
nations prior to the labeling debate, with respect to its more formal language, factual emphasis, 
and less confrontational tone. In the wake of the veto of the draft resolution by Russia, both France 
and the UK have continued to refer to Srebrenica as a genocide.
All told, when deflections and euphemisms are accounted for, explicit references to the 
Srebrenica massacres as a genocide in the documents analyzed are quite limited. Although the 
US makes the most genocide references out of any P5 nation, it is not the dominant frame the US 
employs. Meanwhile, no references to genocide are made by Russia or China from 1995 to 2015; 
instead, both nations rely exclusively on the use of euphemisms when referring to the Srebrenica 
genocide.
A number of different rationales can explain the manner in which the US, UK, and France 
engaged with framing Srebrenica as a genocide. The impetus for the P5 nations to label Srebrenica 
a genocide from 2010 onwards was brought about by a variety of factors pertaining to the power 
of the P5, the effect of domestic politics on international policy, and political cost-benefit analyses. 
Do Monte asserts that in resolutions proposed within the Security Council, permanent members 
can linguistically emphasize certain issues in order to construct a “progressive and liberal” image.76 
Do Monte’s argument appears applicable with respect to debates held in the Security Council 
concerning the Srebrenica genocide. The US has a history of using the UN as a platform to project its 
72 United Nations, 7481st Meeting of the Security Council, New York, July 8, 2015 (UN Doc. S/PV.7481).
73 Ibid.
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75 Ibid.
76 Do Monte, The Pen is Mightier, 679. 
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power through “philanthropic” pursuits with respect to genocide. For example, certain observers 
argue that the US labeling of Darfur as a genocide was politically motivated by a desire to enhance 
the country’s human rights record in the wake of abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib US 
detention sites being uncovered.77 Similar to how Olmastroni notes the Bush government employed 
a particular frame in order to legitimize intervention into Iraq, the US is using the genocide frame 
to promote their own national interests when referring to the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide.78 
By doing so, the US were arguably able to enhance their liberal credentials through the power of 
language within the Security Council.
Timing and domestic politics are another factor that likely influenced the framing of the 
Srebrenica massacres by the US. The initial reference to the massacres as a genocide by the US 
occurred in 2010, shortly after the 2009 inauguration of US President Barack Obama. President 
Obama’s philosophic pragmatism and his willingness to deploy American military power on 
humanitarian grounds informed his foreign policy decision making.79 During the previous 
Republican administration, issues relating to foreign policy were both publicly and politically 
less salient, with UN related goals ranking very lowly in the pursuit of multilateralism.80 Despite 
increased public interest in cooperative internationalism in the early 2000s, this sentiment was not 
echoed by most US Republican politicians and as such became a platform for the Democratic Party 
to use to its advantage in the election.81 As the US shifted to a Democratic administration more 
concerned with cooperative internationalism, and amidst an environment where political backlash, 
especially domestically, for non-intervention in Srebrenica would have been limited, labeling 
Srebrenica a genocide was likely viewed as politically advantageous by the US government.
It is likely that similar to the shift which led to the US labeling Srebrenica a genocide, 
comparable factors affected the UK’s decision to do the same. Historically, atrocities tend to be 
framed as genocide when there would be limited or no costs to a particular nation. For example, 
the Rwandan genocide was only framed as such by the P5 after mass troop commitments were 
no longer necessary to halt the killings.82 Along these lines, labeling the Srebrenica massacres a 
genocide twenty years after they occurred enables nations to promote a liberal discourse whilst 
incurring limited political reprisal for inaction.83 Do Monte furthers this argument by noting that 
the P5 members commonly place emphasis on issues that are unproblematic to them at a domestic 
level through the power ascribed to language within the Security Council.84
The shift towards more emotive language in Council discussions concerning the Srebrenica 
massacres, and the framing of such massacres as genocide by France also merits further consideration. 
Jackson argues that the use of language which appeals to emotion is a tool for the construction of a 
particular reality, having consequences for both social and political structures.85 If one accepts this 
proposition, emotive language may be seen as a form of persuasion which adds a layer of moral 
weight to a discussion. Within the Security Council, a wide vocabulary is employed to express 
member-state’s sentiments regarding a particular issue. Although the works of both Gifkins and 
Gruenberg feature language analyses of pre-ambulatory clauses and resolutions, such research can 
be extrapolated and applied to language within Security Council debates.86 Gruenberg identifies 
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a list of words used within UNSC resolutions that have negative emotional connotations, ranking 
them according to their emotional effects, arguing that words such as “concerned” and “grieved,” 
are emotionally weak, while words such as “indignant” and “censured” are much stronger in 
terms of their emotional impact.87 The words employed by the US and the UK, particularly terms 
such as “condemn” and “deplore,” rank approximately half-way on Gruenberg’s proposed list of 
negative emotive rhetoric. Again, the use of such emotive rhetoric situates the Western P5 nations 
as progressive by “condemning” and “deploring” the actions of others.88 Once again, the manner 
in which the Srebrenica genocide is framed by the P5 nations through linguistic features is heavily 
influenced by the power associated with such language. 
The fact that France only adopts the genocide label within the very debate concerning 
whether the Council will collectively officially label Srebrenica a genocide, was likely influenced 
by the strong historical preference for the US, UK, and France to act as a coalition representing an 
alternative frame to that put forth by Russia and China.89 Do Monte also notes that words used 
within the Security Council can create and alter relations between nations and as such, in order 
to maintain socio-political relationships in a diplomatic space, common linguistic discourses may 
need to be perpetuated at certain junctures.90 The formation of the US-UK-French coalition to 
collectively frame Srebrenica as a genocide also further demonstrates the importance of language 
in maintaining international political relationships within the Security Council.
Use of Euphemisms
In contrast to the rarity of explicit references to genocide in discussions of the Srebrenica massacres 
in the documents analyzed, it was quite common for the P5 members to use alternative, euphemistic 
terminology. Due to the legally mandated obligation to intervene once a situation is labeled 
genocide, alternative terms are readily adopted. Most commonly, terms such as “ethnic cleansing,” 
“mass murder,” or “genocidal acts” are employed in order to avoid the legal implications of 
framing an atrocity as genocide.91
All the P5 nations utilized such linguistic avoidance practices in relation to the situation 
in Srebrenica from 1995 onwards. The manner in which the US, UK, and France use genocidal 
euphemisms within Security Council debates shares a number of similarities. From 1995 to 
approximately 2005, all three nations employed similar euphemisms to linguistically distance 
themselves from framing Srebrenica as a genocide. The euphemisms predominantly used in this 
period include references to “atrocities,” a “humanitarian crisis,” and “mass murder” occurring in 
Srebrenica.
The use of euphemisms after 2005 shifts slightly towards words more commonly associated 
with avoiding the genocide label, the most common being “massacre.” Similarities are again seen 
between the US and the UK, with both placing the killings in Srebrenica in a wider global context 
while still avoiding the use of the genocide label. Such practices are exemplified in the following 
exchange.
US: He [Radovan Karadžić] stands accused as an architect of the Srebrenica massacre, the 
single worst crime committed on European soil since the Second World War.92 
UK: I think it is impossible to talk about Bosnia without talking about Srebrenica. I do not 
think that anybody can remain unmoved by the fate of the over 7,000 Muslim men and boys 
24, 2016, http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1268&context=jil.
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who were massacred, as several people have said, in the worst atrocity in Europe since the 
Second World War. 93
Even when referring to the indictments of Karadžić and Mladić by the ICTY, the UK and the 
US engage with euphemistic language, despite the fact that both men were indicted for genocide 
predicated on their alleged roles in the Srebrenica killings. Following the 2007 ICJ determination 
that these killings legally constitute genocide, euphemisms continued to be employed by all the 
P5 nations, with the Srebrenica genocide most commonly framed as a “massacre.”94 The manner 
in which France and the UK framed the genocide in Srebrenica also changed after 2010, with 
euphemisms no longer employed, but rather, the killings being framed as genocide indirectly, 
through reference to decisions of the ICJ or ICTY. The US, the most variable in terms of its use of 
euphemisms, continues to frame Srebrenica in such a manner in 2014 and 2015, even though it 
makes explicit genocide references over the same time period.
In contrast to the US, the UK, and France, neither Russia nor China rely significantly on the 
use of genocide euphemisms in relevant statements. Russia only frames the Srebrenica genocide 
using euphemistic rhetoric in five Security Council debates from 1995 to 2015, while China utilizes 
such rhetoric in three of these debates. Such euphemisms solely occur in 1995 and during the 
debate concerning whether to officially label Srebrenica a genocide in 2015. Unlike the US, the 
UK, and France, China does not make reference to Srebrenica as a “massacre,” instead, employing 
more formal and impassive linguistic rhetoric, presenting the killings either as a “violation of 
international humanitarian law” or as a “tragedy.”95 Unlike China, Russia employs a variety of 
euphemisms including references to “monstrous crimes,” “ethnic cleansing,” and referring to the 
“tragedy at Srebrenica” as exemplified by the following statement made on July 8, 2015: 
when a delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina first approached us about the need to 
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy at Srebrenica, we agreed that it 
should be done in a solemn manner, given the special sensitivity of the issue for people 
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole.96 
In contrast to these limited uses of euphemisms with regards to the Srebrenica genocide, for 
the most part, silence is the most common discourse within the documents analyzed, as Srebrenica 
is only referenced by Russia and China at times in which such rhetoric could not be avoided. 
Akin to the genocide label, the use of euphemisms is also highly politicized with a plethora of 
variables impacting the way in which nations avoid labeling an atrocity as genocide. With respect to 
the use of euphemisms in framing Srebrenica, such variables include historical reluctance, national 
political stakes, and Security Council politics. The use of language within the Security Council 
is highly political and the use of particular words can have a profound effect on multilateral 
diplomacy.97 As noted previously, Dunne and Gifkins assert that this politicization of linguistic 
frames stems from the emphasis on adhering to previously agreed language.98 The consistent 
use of euphemisms, most commonly by France, the US, and the UK, allows for the continued 
presentation and reaffirmation of a particular position. Labeling an act as genocide would not only 
have incurred legal and moral responsibilities, but would have been difficult, given the consistent 
perpetuation and reaffirmation of euphemisms. Altering this normalized discourse and presenting 
an alternative linguistic frame in the case of the Srebrenica genocide would have presented 
considerable challenges and offered little in the way of political gain for any of the P5 nations. The 
93 United Nations, 5675th Meeting of the Security Council, New York, May 16, 2007 (UN Doc. S/PV.5675).
94 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007.
95 United Nations, 7481st Meeting of the Security Council, New York, July 8, 2015 (UN Doc. S/PV.7481) (Statement by 
Chinese representative Liu Jieyi that “the conflict that occurred in the former Yugoslavia two decades ago is a dark 
page in history. China expresses its condolences for the deaths of innocent civilians in Srebrenica and elsewhere. The 
international community should reflect deeply on history so as to prevent the reoccurrence of such a tragedy.”).
96 Ibid. 
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Rwandan genocide provides a comparable example of a linguistic reluctance to label a genocide 
as such. It was not until there were tangible political motivations to explicitly label the Rwandan 
genocide as a genocide that the use of previously agreed language became less advantageous and 
the genocide label was adopted. This notion of the strong preference for adhering to previously 
agreed language also provides an explanation for the aforementioned point regarding the 
variability in the use of euphemisms and engagement with the genocide label of the US. Engaging 
in such a clear shift in rhetoric within an international organization, where such a discourse has not 
yet become normalized, may have presented difficulties for the US. This argument becomes more 
clear as the media only reinforced the dominance of previously agreed language, with Velagic 
and Velagic finding that journalists most commonly framed Srebrenica as an instance of “ethnic 
cleansing,” even after the 2007 ICJ finding that genocide had been committed in Srebrenica.99 If 
consensus exists regarding previously agreed language, it is not only between the P5 nations; such 
sentiment is also echoed within the media, in that there is little to be gained from altering dominant 
linguistic discourses.100 Akin to Gifkins’ assertion that language is not simply words devoid of 
meaning, Jackson notes that neutrality in language is not possible, as words have histories and 
acquire meaning through discursive settings.101 The word genocide attracts immediate comparisons 
to past atrocities, most notably, the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide, and to apply this term to the 
killings in Srebrenica would have highlighted yet another international humanitarian failure. Such 
an acknowledgment was not in the interest of any of the P5 nations. Consequently, it was more 
attractive to the P5 nations to avoid the power and associated connotations of the genocide label 
when referencing the Srebrenica killings.
The avoidance of the genocide label identified from the data also aligns with literature 
concerning the domestic interests of the US and France. The observed reliance on euphemisms to 
frame Srebrenica enabled the US to initially avoid putting their military personnel in harm’s way. 
This was of particular significance to the US following the death of eighteen soldiers two years 
earlier in Somalia.102 Similarly, France’s framing of Srebrenica may have been influenced by their 
alleged complicity in the Rwandan genocide. An independently commissioned report released 
by the Rwandan government in 2008 condemns most Western nations for their failure to prevent 
or halt the genocide, however, the allegations made against France go much further, identifying 
possible military complicity in the genocide.103 Avoiding accusations of further neglect in relation 
to a genocide that occurred on European soil may have been seen by France as part of a broader 
strategy to deflect attention from its role in Rwanda and to thereby help avoid subsequent legal 
repercussions.104
The way in which Russia and China frame Srebrenica through the use of euphemisms differs 
from that of the US, the UK, and France. Both Russia and China employed silence as their dominant 
discourse when the issue of the Srebrenica killings were raised in P5 discussions, and only resorted 
to the use of euphemisms when maintaining this silence became effectively impossible, specifically 
during the commission of the genocide itself in 1995 and during the debate concerning whether 
to officially label Srebrenica a genocide in 2015. When euphemisms were used, particularly by 
Russia, the previous dominant frame of silence allowed for more weight and power to be ascribed 
to particular linguistic features given the rarity of any reference to Srebrenica whatsoever. Unlike 
the US, the UK, and France, Russia’s eventual framing of the Srebrenica killings as a “massacre” 
99 Velagic and Velagic, Do Court Rulings Matter, 421.
100 Ibid.
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107, accessed September 17, 2016, doi: 10.1080/19392206.2015.1036669. 
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immediately became the country’s official position, due to its previous silence. Schroter asserts that 
one of the central functions of silence is to restrict the potential for opposition.105 In effect, by not 
engaging with the use of euphemisms, Russia and China limited the opportunity for the other P5 
nations to provide opposing rhetoric. This not only demonstrates the unique framing on the part 
of Russia and China, but also identifies the power of linguistic silence. 
The framing of Srebrenica by Russia and China, especially their use of silence, may be due 
to a number of explanations. With respect to international foreign policy, Russia and China view 
collaboration as a counterweight to US hegemony through the promotion of a multipolar, as 
opposed to a unipolar, international discourse. Both nations seek to avoid being taken for granted 
by other P5 nations.106 Monteleone notes that Russia and China engage in a number of practices 
reminiscent of a coalition, such as limiting engagement with the dominant coalition (i.e. the US, the 
UK, and France), as well as joint abstentions and vetoes.107 However, their reasons for collaboration 
differ significantly. China’s behavior in the Security Council is commonly associated with self-
interest and a focus on economic objectives.108 As such, China is unlikely to label Srebrenica a 
genocide given the potential economic costs of intervention and its indifference towards human 
rights issues.109
The bilateral political and economic dialogue between Russia and Serbia also represents 
as a likely factor contributing to Russia’s use of euphemisms and general silence regarding the 
Srebrenica genocide. Serbia is a pivotal ally of Russia, especially in maintaining Russia’s influence 
in the Balkans.110 By avoiding the genocide label through euphemisms and adopting silence as its 
dominant discourse, Russia both protected its political and economic interests, and promoted an 
alternate discourse to that of the US, the UK, and France coalition. 
Conclusion
The discourse analysis of 32 UN Security Council debates related to the Srebrenica genocide between 
1995 and 2015 discussed in this article demonstrates how the P5 nations selectively framed this 
event according to each nation’s own beliefs and strategic interests. Moreover, the politicization of 
the rhetoric used in referring to the Srebrenica genocide appears to also have varied according to 
domestic policy considerations, Security Council power politics, and the complexities of language 
use within an international arena, wherein multiple actors are involved over time. Future studies 
of language use within Security Council debates should focus on other acts of genocide in order to 
ascertain if the trends identified in this article are replicated. An analysis of language used in other 
documents relevant to the Srebrenica genocide, such as ICTY or ICJ decisions, would also provide 
a helpful dataset. 
While some may argue the use of language within the UN Security Council is mere incidental 
semantic variation, the continued avoidance of the genocide label within the Security Council 
in relation to the Srebrenica genocide supports the thesis that the P5 nations use language as a 
mechanism to frame a conflict in a particular manner that aligns with their own political interests. 
As such, this article reaffirms the importance of genocide recognition as more than a legal issue. 
Rather, such recognition, or lack thereof, in various fora, including the official statements of the P5 
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Security Council nations, has the ability to increase or decrease communal violence and revenge, 
and to either help alleviate or perpetuate, transgenerational cultural trauma associated with denial.
Acknowledgements
I would like to sincerely thank Dr Helen Berents for her invaluable feedback, support and insight 
in re-framing this article. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their engaged 
and constructive feedback.
Bibliography 
Annan, Kofi. “May we all Learn and Act on the Lessons of Srebrenica.” Speech, New York, July 11, 
2005. Accessed August 5, 2016. http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm9993.doc.htm.
Ban, Ki-moon. “Srebrenica: remembering and Honouring the Victims of the Genocide.” Speech, 
New York, July 1, 2015. Accessed August 12, 2016. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/
sg/statement/2015-07-01/secretary-generals-remarks-high-level-commemorative-event-
srebrenica.
Blum, Rony, Gregory H. Stanton, Shira Sagi, and Elihu D. Richter. “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Bleaches the 
Atrocities of Genocide.” European Journal of Public Health 18, no. 2 (2008), 204-209. Accessed 
April 28, 2015. Doi: 10.1093/eurpub/ckm011
Brunborg, Helge, Torkild Hoyde Lyngstad and Henrick Urdal. “Accounting for Genocide: How 
many were Killed in Srebrenica?” European Journal of Population 19, no. 1 (2003), 229-258. 
Accessed May 12, 2016. Doi: 10.1023/A:1024949307841.
Burkhalter, Holly. “What can we do to stop this genocide?” Washington Post, July 20, 1995. 
Accessed March 12, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/07/20/
what-we-can-do-to-stop-this-genocide/49e17fad-cee2-4b47-b316-6db07df51efc/?utm_
term=.3b6238494b97.
Busby, Joshua and Jonathan Monten. “Republican Elites and Foreign Policy attitudes.” Political 
Science Quarterly 127, no. 1 (2012), 105-142. Accessed August 24, 2016. http://search.
proquest.com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/docview/1018688760?pq-origsite=summon.
Cameron, Hazel. “The French connection: Complicity in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” African Security 
8, no. 2 (2015), 96-119. Accessed September 17, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/19392206.2015.1036669
Churchill, Winston. “Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s Broadcast to the World about the Meeting 
with President Roosevelt.” Speech, London, August 24, 1941. Accessed October 18, 2018. 
https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410824awp.html.
Claude, Inis. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations.” 
International Organisation 20, no. 3 (1996), 367-379. Accessed May 14, 2016. Doi: 10.1017/
S0020818300012832
Cooper, Belinda and Taner Akçam. “Turks, Armenians, and the “G-Word.”” World Policy Journal 22, 
no.3 (2005), 81-93. Accessed October 16, 2018. https://search-proquest-com.ezp01.library.
qut.edu.au/docview/232587799?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=13380. 
De Waal, Alex. “Reflections on the Difficulties of Defining Darfur’s Crisis as Genocide.” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 20, no. 1 (2007), 2025-2033. Accessed August 12, 2017. 
http://heinonline.org.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/
hhrj20&collection=journals&page=25.
Do Monte, Izandora Xavier. “The Pen is Mightier than the H-bomb.” International Journal of Postcolonial 
Studies 18, no.5 (2016), 669-686. Accessed August 3, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/1369801X.2015.1131180
Dunne, Tim and Jess Gifkins. “Libya and the State of Intervention.” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011), 515-529. Accessed May 16, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/10357718.2011.613148 
Entman, Robert. “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 
9/11.” Political Communication 20, no. 4 (2003), 415-432. Accessed June 14, 2017. 
Doi: 10.1080/10584600390244176
Entman, Robert. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 
43, no. 4 (1993), 51-58. Accessed July 4, 2016. Doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x
Ringrose
©2020     Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1603
140
Fein, Helen, Walter Ezell and Herbert F. Spirer. “Recognition of Genocide in Bosnia: Frameworks 
of Interpretation in US Newspapers.” Studies in Communications 6, no. 1 (2011), 77–92. 
Accessed April 14, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0275-7982(2011)0000006007.
Fierke, Karin Marie. “Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations.” 
International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2002), 331–354. Accessed May 14, 2016. http://www.
jstor.org.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/stable/3096092.
Forsythe, David. “The UN Security Council and Responses to Atrocities: International Criminal 
Law and the P-5.” Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2012), 840-863. Accessed August 8, 
2016. Doi 10.1353/hrq.2012.0054
Gifkins, Jess. “R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and Beyond.” Cooperation and Conflict 
51, no. 2 (2016), 148-165. Accessed March 14, 2016. Doi: 10.1177/0010836715613365
Glanville, Luke. “Is “Genocide” Still a Powerful Word.” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 4 (2009), 
467-486. Accessed November 19, 2018. Doi: 10.1080/14623520903309529
Goffman, Erving. Frame Analysis. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974.
Gries, Peter. The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives 
over Foreign Affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.  
Gruenberg, Justin. “An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are all 
Countries Treated Equally?” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 41, no. 1 
(2009), 561-495. Accessed August 24, 2016. http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1268&context=jil.
Harff, Barbara. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 57-73. Accessed 
April 14, 2016. Doi: 10.1017/S0003055403000522
Heinze, Eric. “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared.” 
Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 3 (2007), 359-383. Accessed June 12, 2016. Doi: 10.1002/j.1538-
165X.2007.tb00602.x
Herman, Edward and David Peterson. The Politics of Genocide. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2010.
International Court of Justice. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, February 26, 2007. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. “Prosecutor Serge Brammertz meets 
with Representatives of Victims Associations.” Statement, The Hague, September 30, 2014. 
Accessed June 12, 2016. http://www.icty.org/en/press/prosecutor-serge-brammertz-met-
representatives-victims-associations.
Jackson, Richard. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005. 
Kalayjian, Anie and Marian Weisberg. “Generational Impacts of Mass Trauma: The Post-Ottoman 
Turkish Genocide of the Armenians.” In Jihad and Sacred Vengeance, edited by Jerry S. Piven, 
Chris Boyd and Henry W. Lawton, 254-278. New York: Writers Club Press, 2002.
Kendall, Bridget. “Russia vetoes UN move to call Srebrenica ‘genocide.’” British Broadcasting 
Corporation, July 8, 2015. Accessed August 12, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-33445772. 
Kovacevic, Danijel. “Bosnian Serbs to Ban Lessons on Srebrenica Genocide.” Balkan Transnational 
Justice, June 6, 2017. Accessed March 4, 2018. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/
bosnian-serbs-to-ban-lectures-on-srebrenica-sarajevo-siege-06-06-2017.
Luban, David. “Calling Genocide by its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur and the UN 
Report.” Georgetown University Law Centre 7, no. 1 (2006), 303-320. Accessed September 9, 
2016. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/893/.
Mangassarian, Selina L. “100 years of Trauma: The Armenian Genocide and Intergenerational 
Cultural Trauma.” Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 25, no.4 (2016), 1-11. 
Accessed September 10, 2018. Doi: 10.1080/10926771.2015.1121191
Marcinkowski, Bartosz. “Balkan’s Bad Boy Goes West: Serbia’s Challenges on the way to the EU.” 
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 24, no. 3 (2015), 59-72. Accessed September 
The Politicization of the Genocide Label: Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council
©2020     Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1603
141
11, 2016, http://search.proquest.com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/docview/1757725978?pq-
origsite=summo.
Merry, Melissa K. “Constructing Policy Narratives in 140 Characters or less: The Case of Gun 
Policy Organizations.” Policy Studies Journal 44, no. 4 (2016), 373-395. Accessed June 12, 
2017. Doi: 10.1111/psj.12142
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. “Bilateral Relations with Foreign Countries.” 
Accessed August 29, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/
bilateralni-odnosi/117-bilateralni-odnosi/11519-ruska-federacija?lang=cyr. 
Mintz, Alex and Steven Redd. “Framing Effects in International Relations.” Synthese 135, no. 2 
(2002), 193-213. Accessed July 2, 2016. Doi: 10.1023/a:1023460923628
Monteleone, Carla. “Coalition Building in the UN Security Council.” International Relations 29, no. 
1 (2014), 45-68. Accessed August 12, 2016. Doi: 10.1177/0047117814552140
Morphet, Sally. “China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council.” Security Dialogue 31, no. 
2 (2000), 151-166. Accessed August 8, 2016. Doi: 10.1177/0967010600031002002
Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena. “Knowledge, Acknowledgement and Denial in Serbia’s Responses to 
the Srebrenica Massacre.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17, no. 1 (2009), 61-74. 
Accessed March 30, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/14782800902844719
Olmastroni, Francesco. Framing War. New York: Routledge, 2014. 
McDoom,  Omar. “Predicting Violence within Genocide: A Model of Elite Competition and Ethnic 
Segregation from Rwanda.” Political Geography 42, no. 2 (2014), 34-45. Accessed May 30, 
2015. Doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.05.006
Poland, Blake and Ann Pederson. “Reading Between the Lines: Interpreting Silences in 
Qualitative Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 4, no. 2 (1998), 293-312. Accessed May 11, 2016. 
Doi: 10.1177/107780049800400209
Power, Samantha. A Problem from hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2007.
Rijsdijk, Erna. “The Politics of Hard Knowledge: Uncertainty, Intelligence Failures and the ‘Last 
Minute Genocide’ of Srebrenica.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011), 2221-2235. 
Accessed May 7, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/17512786.2013.841370
Rothe, Dawn and Christopher Mullins. “Darfur and the Politicization of International Law: 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?” Humanity and Society 31, no.1 (2007), 83-107. 
Accessed May 12, 2016, http://has.sagepub.com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/content/31/1/83.
full.pdf+html.
Scheufele, Dietram. “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication 49, no. 1 
(1999), 103-122. Accessed July 2, 2016. Doi: 10.1093/joc/49.1.103
Schmitt, Paul. “The Future of Genocide Suits at the International Court of Justice: France’s Role in 
Rwanda and Implications of the Bosnia V. Serbia Decision.” Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 40, no. 1 (2009), 585- 623. Accessed August 13, 2016, http://go.galegroup.com.ezp01.library.
qut.edu.au/ps/i.do?p=LT&u=qut&id=GALE|A195265742&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon.
Schröter, Melani. Silence and Concealment in Political Discourse. Lancaster: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 2015. 
Security Council Report. Srebrenica Anniversary. July 1, 2015. http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/monthly-forecast/2015-07/bosnia_and_herzegovina_5.php.
Southwick, Katherine. “Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstic Decision and the Language of the 
Unspeakable.” Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 8, no. 1 (2005), 188- 203. Accessed 
May 11, 2016. http://go.galegroup.com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/ps/i.do?p=LT&u=qut&id=
GALE|A134381809&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon&userGroup=qut&authCount=1.
Staub, Ervin. “The Roots and Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Violence.” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 47, no. 4 (2012), 821-842. Accessed March 1, 2016. Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9744.2012.01302.x
Standish, Reid. “Why did Russia Veto Recognizing Srebrenica as Genocide,” Foreign Policy, July 
9, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-
recognizing-srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-bosni
Stanton, Gregory. “Cost of Denial.” Speech, April 23, 2008. Accessed June 6, 2016. http://www.
genocidewatch.com/cost-of-denial.
Ringrose
©2020     Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1603
142
Totten, Samuel. “The US Investigation into the Darfur Crisis and the US Government’s 
Determination of Genocide.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 1, no. 9 
(2006), 1-23. Accessed February 21, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1256&context=gsp.
United Nations. General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, December 9, 1948. UN Doc. A/RES260(III). 
---------. 3199th meeting of the Security Council, April 16, 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/819.
---------. 5675th Meeting of the Security Council, May 16, 2007. UN Doc. S/PV.5675.
---------. 6421st Meeting of the Security Council, November 11, 2010. UN Doc. S/PV. 6421.
---------. Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, July 2014. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/
adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf.  
---------. 7332nd Meeting of the Security Council, December 10, 2014. UN Doc. S/PV.7332.
---------. 7440th Meeting of the Security Council, May 12, 2015. UN Doc. S/PV.7440.
---------. 7481st Meeting of the Security Council, July 8, 2015/ UN Doc. S/PV.7481.
Van Den Herik, Larissa. “Accountability Through Fact Finding: Appraising Inquiry in the Context 
of Srebrenica.” Netherlands International Law Review 62, no. 2 (2015), 259-311. Accessed April 
5, 2016. Doi: 10.1007/s40802-015-0035-9
Velagic, Mirza and Zlatka Velagic. “Do Court Rulings Matter? International Courts and Journalists’ 
Framing of the Srebrenica genocide.”  Journalism Practice 8, no. 4 (2014), 421-437. Accessed 
July 2, 2016. Doi: 10.1080/17512786.2013.841370
Werner, Wouter. “Recall it again, Sam. Practices of Repetition in the Security Council.” Nordic 
Journal of International Law 86, no. 2 (2017), 151-169. Accessed January 22, 2018. 
Doi: 10.1163/15718107-08602001 
